were replaced by settlement schemes directly involving Cyprus itself.
To Zionist minds, if Cyprus could be colonized by Jewish people, it could constitute a firm base, a vantage-point which could in future enable them to achieve their ultimate goal, i.e. colonization of Palestine. A proposal put forward in January 1901 that England should exchange Cyprus for German East Af rica led Zionist leader Herzl to speculate: "Germany would then have to welcome a Jewish settlement in Cyprus with delight. We should rally on Cyprus and one day go över to Eretz Israel and take it by force..." 6 Zionist plans for settlement had, from the summer of 1902 began to evolve around territories close to Palestine, including Cyprus. In July 1902, Herzl, for several times, discussed with Lord Rothschild, a devoted supporter of Zionist schemes, for Jewish settlement plans involving the Sinai Peninsula, Egyptian Palestine (El Arısh), and Cyprus. 7 On 23 October 1903 Herzl had a chance to meet Britain's Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain and put the same plan to him. Colonial Secretary's reply was of no encouragment to the Zionist plan, since "the proposed mainland settlements v/ere a matter for the Foreign Office, and, as regards Cyprus, Greeks and Moslems already lived there and the British government hnd a duty to stand by them." Besides, according to Chamberlain, "there would be real difficulties if the Cypriote Greeks resisted with the support of Greece and Russia." However, the Colonial Secretary was adHamid II had issued an eaict against aliens holding or acguiring real estate in Palestine, and against the creation there of any further Jewish colonies. See: John and Hadawi, op. cit, p. 7. Island of Cyprus, which had been Turkish territory since 1571, was transferred to British rule under the conditions stated in the Convention of 1878. The adamant attitude of Ottoman administration in preventing Jewish colonization in Palestine left only one option to the Zionists: Trading some other territory in exchange. This territory could be Cyprus, they began to contemplate, since Ottomans were not happy in handing it to the British in the fxrst place. ding, if Herzl "could show him a spot in the English possession where there were no white people as yet", they could talk about it. Also, Chamberlain was not hiding his fear of public opinion and said that "in our country everything is out in open, and if Cyprus were discussed in this way a storm will break out immidiately". 8 Although Herzl proposed to start a campaign and "have a current created in our favour in Cyprus", Chamberlain could only give his blessing to the Sinai settlement part of the plan, which was soon to be dropped, owing to lack of water in the area. 9 So, although Herzl thought that "the Moslems will move away, the Greeks will gladly seli their lands at a good price and emigrate to Athens or Crete", 10 these initial settlement plans for Cyprus had failed.
Zionist Plans Concerning Cyprus Following World War I
When Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on Germany's side, England put aside the 1878 Convention and annexed Cyprus. During the war, desperate in the Balkans, England and her allies tried to induce Balkan states, including Greece to take side with them. British government first promised Greece "important concessions on the coasts of Asia Minör" after the war. Then came the Cyprus offer. On October 16, 1915, British government offered Cyprus to Greece if she entered the war on Britain's side. Greece refused. But this refusal had come from the King of Greece and his cabinet. Veııizelos, who was restored to power by the Allies, was ready to receive any territorial bribe. Thus, after the war, Venizelos, while engaging in an adventure in Turkey with Britain's firm support, at the same time, silently awaited the day the "generous British Empire" would hand Cyprus över to Greece just as it did the Ionian Islands (and Anatolia)! This was supported by loud Greek Cypriot propoganda for "enosis".
c Up to that date, in addition to, and in a way in collaboration with, the propaganda (stated above in fn. 5) against the value of Cyprus to Great Britain, "union with Greece" propogandists were active and could acquire substantial support among British politicians. So, Chamberlain can be understood in his fear that if the subject of Cyprus is raised, it would bring in the storm awaiting. 9 Patai (Ed.), op. cit, Vol. IV, p. 1361, from Purcell, op. cit., p. 211.
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At the end of the War, the Ottoman Empire had completed its life span, and it was the time to "solve" the Eastern question for once and ali... Almost ali of Turkey was put under Allied occupation and Western Anatolia was opened for Greek atrocitics. Ali parties interested in the partition of the Ottoman Empire were active during the months following the end of the war. Zionists had already received promises especially from their British friends. In this atmosphere, Zionist and Greek claims inevitably clashed över Cyprus. But the British, while "generously" distributing "rights" över other war spoils, were not willing to give up Cyprus to either of these claimants. Attached to the mesage of Gosling is the paper submitted by David Treitsch, the "prominent Jewish Zionist": "... I shoulcJ regard it as an unnecessary sacrifice on the part of Great Brıtain and as a great misfortune for Jewish colonization in Cyprus (as part of a Greater Palestine) if the country should gc to Greece." Mr. Treitsch, then goes on to support his view that "there is room for Jewish people in Cyprus" by stating that the present population of the island is only 300.000, vvhile, before the Turkish conquest it used to be one or t.wo million. Then, he goes on to reveal the details of his plan: "If...by means of Jewish immigration and colonization the country could soon be made to floıırish again it would become a most valuable possession, and by the same course the Jewish and the Moslem popuiations combmed could in a short time outnumber the so-called Greeks and bring the anti-British propoganda to a stand-still. The accelerated development...would... benefit materially the whole of the population...so that ali other considerations may soon disappear.
"Since the British declaration of November 2nd, 191712 the greater part of a Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe is destined to go to Palestine. But Palestine, after ali, is a small country and will only with great difficulties be made to shelter and nourish the millions who must (or at least who ought to) leave their previous abodes...Palestine proper is by far too small to receive that large part of the Jewish race... so we must try to establish... for those fugitives some sort of a 'Greater Palestine'. This "prominent Jewish Zionist" was raising several points to support his plan:
1 -Palestine was too small for the "Jewish race", therefore Jewish immigration to areas adjacent Palestine must also be provided, thus a "Greater Palestine" (including, Cyprus, Rhodes and El Arish) plan must be put into action.
2 -If Jevvish colonization in Cyprus was permitted, the island would soon "flourish" again and material wealth would help "ali other considerations" including "enosis" disappear. Besides, Jewish immigrants, when combined with Moslems (of course the consent of the Moslem population was out of question here) would outnumber the Greeks who were creating the "Cyprus problem".
The reaction of the British administration (or at least of the Colonial Office) to this plan is reflected by one sentence put on the file by one of the undersecreteries: 13 "There is no room for Jews in Cyprus and if they came they would get a 'warm' reception. Putley (signed) 23/7)".
12 The "Balfour Declaration". 1 3 CO 67/194, idem. The file is numbered CO 42553.
Here, Undersecretary Putley's prophetic and ironic remark that "if the Jews came they v/ould get a 'warm' reception in Cyprus" is interesting to note. It is not easy to guess whether his beiief in this direction was generated from recent experience 14 or not, but one can find substantial material in the history of Cyprus to support Putley's view.
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Jewish Migı-ation to Cyprus Before the Second World War
The rise of fascism and nazizm in Italy and Germany, and overriding tendencies similar to these in other autocratic regimes in central and eastern Europe during 1930's, had led Jews living in these areas to seek sanctuaries else\vhere. A document dated October 1938, shows that Cyprus had been subject to Jewish -legal and illegal-migration during this period. This document also reveals that Jewish migration had culminated in the rise of anti-semitic feelings and certain uneasiness among the population of Cyprus. The Governor of Cyprus, on 17 October 1938, v/rote: 16 "... So long as we pursue our present policy I do not think that there will ba serious troubie fer it is well understood that Government is not going to permit anything in the nature of settlement by Jews or a competition of Jewish labour with Cypriote labour, but if we depart from our present policy materially, the only result v/ill be so far as I can see, to extend the Palestine problem to Cyprus as we!l. Ali this is 14 If we look at the developments before the above mentioned letter was written by the Governor of Cyprus, we can easily grasp why he insisted that "the present Government policy should not be changed" and Jewish migration to Cyprus must not be let to become a systematic and wide practice. Starting from the summer of 1938, pressures from several Jewish leaders from different places were being put on British Government to allow big" numbers of Jewish people into Cyprus. British Government, or in this case the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in turn begun to put pressure on the Governor of Cyprus, in the same direetion.
In June, July and August 1938, "The Council for German Jewry", Dr. Max Ermers (representing Austrian Jews) and Fran Luzzato (representing Jewish people in Italy), have ali petitioned British Government to permit them to go on with their plans for settlement in Cyprus. 17 British Government, especially the Colonial Office seriously considered these proposals. 18 At the end of September, Malcolm MacDonald, the Co- 
A Detailed Zionist Sclıeme for Cyprus -1939
The most radical, ambitious and detailed scheme for Jewish settlement in Cyprus is the one submitted to the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and, Malcolm Macdonald, Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill on 11 March 1939 by three Jewish leaders. 26 This plan, titled "A Solution to the Jewish Problem", proposed "entire evacuation of the present population of Cyprus, which could be settled in the district of Selonica," and Jews living in Selonica were to be transferred to Cyprus. Thus, room would be opened for Jewish settlement in Cyprus. It was aclded that ali transfer costs would be paid by "Jewish sources". The details of the plan were:
"The Jews of Selonika would form the nucleus of a new, entirely Jewish population in Cyprus. This island would support över a million Jews, and the population would grow through natural migration of Jews from ali countries, especially those where persecution is prevalent."
To support the plan, the following points were raised:
(1) By transfering the Greek population in Cyprus to Greece, these people who wished to be united with Greece would be made happy. "The experience of the Greeks in the accomodation of their distressed people from Asia Minör would facilitate the handling of the problem."
(2) Britain would gain the friendship of a loyal population at a strategic location.
(3) "Palestinian problem would be rapidly solved, as the Arabs would no longer be subject to pressure of Jews desiring to enter and reşide in Palestine".
(4) "The Jews would have a country of their own, bounded by the sea, protected by the British Navy, and at the same time would be living in very close proximity to their cultural centre (Jerusalem) and their young people would have access to the general education facilities of Palestine, and its university."
(5) "The Jewish problem will never be solved by increasing the density of the Jewish element in any other population. A problem similar to that created in Germany is already evident even in this country. A country solely Jewish (except for Naval and Military establishments) is essential to a satisfactory solution."
It is then stated that, Dr. Rosskamm, one of the signatories, would be happy and available to give additional explanation regarding the scheme should ıt be necessary: "Dr. Rosskamm is a Jewish refugee from Germany -resident in England for the past six years. He has travelled widely, and is familiar with the Jewish outlook in many parts of the world..."
This new scheme differed in an important aspect from the previous ones: While other, earlier plans looked at Cyprus as an additional settlement area, and regarded Palestine essential, this new scheme proposed Cyprus instead of Palestine. Material is not available to indicate how widely this scheme was accepted in Jewish circles. But one of the main motives behind it must have been the evident difficulty Jews were facing in this period in countering the resistance of the Arab majority in Palestine. Thus, in order to persuade Britain to give way in Cyprus, these Jews were offering "solutions" to her on two fronts: This scheme would solve the Palestine problem and would end lıostilities in Cyprus against the British. Formulators of this plan were not forgetting to add that they would be willing to give Britain certain naval and military facilities on the island. In turn, they would seek security under British proteetive umbrella in Eastern Mediterranean.
The reaction of the British Government to this proposal was negative. A messege from the Prime Minister's Office to the Colonial Office was worded thus: "I have sent an acknowledgement and explained that it would not be possible for the Prime Minister to receive Dr. Rosskamm." 
Jevvish "camps" in Cyprus During the Second World War
Begining from the last months of 1939, Jewish immigration to Cyprus was legalized and systematized. The British, at war with Nazi Germany whose practices at this period against "non-aryan populations", especially the jews, are well known and infamous even today, must have feit obliged to provide shelter to these oppressed and persecuted people. Two places were thought of as proper British sanctuaries for the Jews: Palestine and Cyprus. Of course, regarding Palestine, the British had already given their word to the Zionist since the well known "Balfour Declaration" and this promise was not for a temporary shelter but for a "Jevvish homeland" in Palestine. But in Cyprus only temporary settlement would be provided, and this scheme eventually turned out to work as a "springing board" for Jewish settlement in Palestine.
On the 25th of October 1939, in the Colonial Office, the Secretary of State and the undersecretaries discussed a "suggestion which had been made that Palestine and Cyprus could afford some assistance towards alleviating the problem of the Polish civilian refugees in Rumania." 28 The course of the discussion and the decisions reached in the end are a follows:
"... With regard to Cyprus, the Secretary of State said that while there were serious objections to the proponal to admit these refugees to Cyprus even temporariiy, he would nevertheless be willing to send a telegram to the Governor, emphasizing the seriousness of the problem, asking whether Cyprus could contribute towards its alleviation by affording temporary shelter to some of the refugees in a camp... The telegram should mention the percentage of the Jews and enquire vvhether the Governor saw grave economic or political objections to the project. Governor should also be told that no expense, beyond that of the normal services of Government would fail upon the revenues of the Colony..."
During the discussion the following points were raised and agreed upon: 1) At most, 1,000 refugees should be sent to Cyprus; 2) "in order to satisfy local epinion, the Cyprus Government should be furnished with absolute guarantees that the refugees would in fact be removed elsewhere immidiately the war was över, or sooner."
The outeome of this discussion was conveyed to the Governor of Cyprus in a telegram by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, "emphasizing the seriousness of the problem", on 2 October 1939. The Governor's reply was affirmative, but he emphasized that this should only be a limiteti and temporary scheme. 29 But, although the Jewish "camp" scheme contained conditions as to the limitation of number (i.e. rot more than 1,000) and duration (till the end of the war or before), facts show us that in practice camps sheltered thousands of refugees and continued even after the war. After the war, the presence of Jewish camps added one more factor of disturbance to the life of the already socially unrest island. But, nonetheless, these "camps" were later to become a part of another "permanent" scheme elsewhere, i.e. Palestine.
After the War: Cyprus -the Zionist "springing board"
Social and economic situation in Cyprus after the war, and the role of the Jewish "camps" is explained by Crawshaw as follows: 30 "After the war unrest increased. Military expenditure was curtailed, the island's economic and strategic developmeııt had not yet begun. Markets which had readily absorbed Cypriot produce during the war were now entered by competitors. The detention of illegal Jewish immigrants in camps near Famagusta aroused Cypriot fears that the arrangement might be permanent and intended to reduce the Greek proportion of the population. Their presence, the Mayor of Limassol alleged, was responsible for shortages and rising prices..."
After the war, British authorities actually began to transfer the Jewish immigrants "elsewhere", as the temporary settle-ment scheme of October-November 1939 had proposed. But this "elsewhere" happened to be Palestine, and not only those who were present already in the camps were transferred, but also those camps were used as terminals on the way to Palestine. Jewish people arrived in Cyprus from other places, and were transferred to Palestine in thousands. This practice continued even after the British Goverment's decision to give "independence" to Palestine was announced as the "Bevin Scheme" on 7 February 1947. 31 Governor's Reports for the year 1947 32 clearly show that
Cyprus was systematically used as a Jewish "springing board" to colonize Palestine. Governor's Reports for March to September 1947 indicate that, during that period constant number of Jews present in camps of Cyprus were 15 to 16 thousand, and thousands were sent to Palestine continiously. 33 October Report stated that, number of Jewish people in the said camps on October 30 was 17,540; "4,000 new arrivals came in during the month and 1,200 were transhipped as legal immigrants". 34 Governor's Report for December indicated that with 16,755 new arrivals during the month, the number of refugees in the camps rose to 31,081, and that the "transshipment" to Palestine was accelerated. 35 Under the light of the above stated data, it is appropriate to state that, although the efforts of the Zionists since 1896 to colonize Cyprus in addition to or instead of Palestine failed, they, nevertheless, after the Second World War, succeeded in using Cyprus as a "springing board" in the process of inereasing the Jewish population in I klestine against the wishes of the Arab and Moslem majority. This fact, among others, is evidence to prove Britain's role in the emergence of the Middle East conflict in the post-War period.
